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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the impact of intermittent wind generation on hourly 
equilibrium prices and output, using data on expected wind generation 
capacity and demand for 2020. Hourly wind data for the period 1993-2005 
are used to obtain wind output generation profiles for thirty regions (onshore 
and offshore) across Great Britain. Matching the wind profiles for each month 
to the actual hourly demand (scaled to possible 2020 values), we find that the 
volatility of prices will increase, and that there is significant year-to-year 
variation in generators’ profits.  Above-average wind speeds lead to below-
average prices, but annual revenues for British wind generators (producing 
more in the winter) are almost as great as for base load generators.  In the 
presence of significant market power (the equivalent of two symmetric firms 
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owning fossil-fuelled capacity, rather than six), the level of prices more than 
doubled, and their volatility increased.  However, wind generators’ average 
revenues rose by 20% less than those of baseload plant. 
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1. Introduction 
If the UK is to meet its targets for renewable electricity generation, a very large 
amount of wind power capacity (onshore and offshore) will have to be installed.  It is 
well known that wind generation can be intermittent and unpredictable, and that this 
can pose problems for the industry.  Put simply, if there is little wind when the 
demand for power is high, there is a significant risk that a system with a high 
penetration of wind capacity will have a shortage of power, unless that system carries 
a large amount of reserve plant, and accepts the costs entailed in doing so.  The recent 
assessment by the UK Energy Research Centre (Gross et al, 2006) studies these costs, 
and shows that they should be acceptable for the UK, at least up to penetration levels 
of around 20% of intermittent generation.  This assessment was made from a technical 
point of view, however, and while it looked at the impact on the costs of the 
electricity system, it did not study the impact on market prices.  That is the purpose of 
this paper. 
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Our aim is to predict the amount of price and revenue volatility that could 
arise from variable wind speeds in 2020.  This is the year by which the EU’s 20% 
renewable energy target is to be met.  In the UK’s case, the target is likely to require 
around a third of electricity to come from renewable sources, and the majority of this 
would be from wind power.  We will present frequency distributions for short-term 
hourly energy prices in each month, of the kind that a standard real-time electricity 
market would produce.1  We will also present distributions of the annual revenues 
received by wind stations in different locations, to see whether the volatility of wind 
speeds is a significant risk to the generators. 
We use hourly data from the Meteorological Office, covering 1993 to 2005, 
which give wind speeds at a variety of locations around Great Britain.  We transform 
this wind data to give the level of output from a typical turbine at each location, using 
standard relationships between wind speed and power.  We have used data from the 
British Wind Energy Association, giving the locations of existing stations and those at 
various stages of the planning and construction process, to guide our estimates of 
where to site wind capacity.   
We have used the Supergen Futurenet scenarios for 2020 (Elders et al, 2008) 
for predictions of the amount of thermal plant in Great Britain, and the overall level of 
demand.  These scenarios were constructed to show how the system might evolve 
over the next few years, and are themselves intermediate stages towards a set of 
scenarios for 2050.  The focus of the scenarios is on the impact on electricity 
networks, and in future work, we will be considering the network implications of our 
output patterns.  We take the costs of each type of generator from the DTI Energy 
Review of 2006, using fuel prices from their Central Case favouring coal (which 
implies medium-high gas prices).   
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 While the overall level of demand is taken from the Supergen Futurenet 
scenarios, the demand patterns within the year need consideration, since the weather 
(and hence wind speeds) is intimately linked with demand on a day-to-day basis.  Our 
approach is to match wind patterns and demand patterns from individual days, while 
scaling demand from its original year to match that predicted in 2020.  We are 
conscious that this does not allow for the impact of climate change on demand, and 
hope that this will be limited in the period to 2020. 
 We use a numerical supply function equilibrium model to calculate the market 
outcomes on an hourly basis.  The model allows for imperfect competition between 
generating firms, and is a better representation of this than the Cournot models that 
are the most common alternative.  In particular, if there are a reasonable number of 
firms, off-peak prices will be very close to the companies’ marginal costs, while peak 
prices can still rise above marginal fuel and O&M costs, as seen in real electricity 
markets.  The particular version of the model used is based upon that of Green 
(2008a). 
 We calculate the equilibrium market price patterns on the basis of the actual 
wind profiles and the historic demand levels, scaled up to 2020 levels, for each day 
between 1993 and 2005.  This gives us between 367 and 403 price profiles per month 
(ranging from February with 28 days in 10 of our years, plus three leap years, to the 
months with 31 days in all 13 years), which is sufficient to show a significant amount 
of volatility.  We also consider annual revenue risks, which are based on the actual 
annual wind profiles.  Using random combinations of 12 months or 365 days could 
have generated more observations (some of which would have been extreme) but ran 
the risk of (implicitly) creating a time series of wind speeds that could not occur in 
nature.   
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 Finally, we will consider the sensitivity of our results to the level of market 
power among thermal generators.  Twomey and Neuhoff (this issue) have shown how 
market power can amplify the revenue volatility faced by renewable generators, 
because the margins between price and marginal cost are likely to be at their highest 
when thermal demand is high (and hence wind output is low), and lower when high 
wind outputs depress the demand for thermal plant.  Their model is a largely 
theoretical one, and our simulations offer a chance to explore the importance of this 
issue in practice. 
Our results indicate that with a sufficiently large share of wind generation, 
hourly wind output volatility would have a strong influence over wholesale spot 
prices. We show that the short term impact of this volatility could be further 
exacerbated by the presence of market power (amongst conventional generators), but 
the volatility in wind generators’ incomes should rise only in proportion to these 
incomes.  Wind generators gain significantly from market power, in that their 
revenues more than double when we move from 6 firms to 2.  However, a base-load 
generator gains even more, with average revenues 18% greater than our average 
onshore wind generator. 
 In the next section, we consider previous work on the interaction between 
wind generation and electricity wholesale markets.  We then outline our simulation 
model in more detail, and discuss the steps needed to obtain a set of hourly wind 
outputs at locations around Great Britain.  Section 5 presents our results for the 
volatility of prices and generators’ revenues in a workably competitive wholesale 
market.  In section 6, we consider the impact of a duopoly – which in the context of 
electricity is far from a workably competitive market – on these results. Finally, 
section 7 offers conclusions and suggestions for further work. 
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2. Previous Work 
Given the dramatic increase in the amount of wind generation, it is hardly surprising 
that it has attracted academic attention.  Much of this work is in the engineering 
literature, studying the technical challenges of integrating a potentially large amount 
of variable and intermittent generation into the electricity system.  Studies relevant to 
the UK are surveyed and summarised by Gross et al (2006).  They find that with 
about 20% of intermittent generation, the costs of additional balancing capacity (for 
short-term fluctuations) and reserve (for periods without wind) would be around £5-
8/MWh of wind generation.  
 The interaction between wind generation and the wholesale market can be 
considered on a variety of scales2.  At the micro scale, some studies consider trading 
strategies for individual generators.  For example, Bathurst et al (2002) showed how 
the NETA imbalance pricing regime (since amended) might mean that a wind 
generator in England and Wales would obtain a negative average revenue.  In the 
Nordic market, in which a generator normally has to trade between 12 and 36 hours 
before delivery, Holttinen (2005) shows trading between 6 and 12 hours in advance 
would increase its net income by 4%, and trading just one hour before delivery would 
increase net income by 8% (in total).  This would also reduce the cost of thermal 
power, according to Müsgens and Neuhoff (2006), since there would be fewer times 
when a thermal station would be started up on the basis of trading in the day-ahead 
markets, only to find that wind power that had not been expected at that point would 
substitute for their output. 
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 At a macro scale, Sensfuss et al (2007) and Sáenz de Miera et al (2008) have 
shown that wind generators can depress wholesale prices by reducing the average 
demand for thermal generation.  Sensfuss et al study Germany while Sáenz de Miera 
et al study Spain, but in both cases, the estimated impact on wholesale market prices 
is roughly equal to the cost of supporting renewable generators.  This implies that in 
the short term, the support for renewable generators has come from thermal generators 
rather than electricity consumers.  In the longer term, as Sáenz de Miera et al point 
out, electricity wholesale prices should return to the level needed to remunerate the 
appropriate mix of capacity for the expected pattern of demand.  The long-run time-
weighted average price should hardly react to the amount of wind generation.3  The 
amount and pattern of price volatility should still affect the demand-weighted average 
price, however.   
 The amount of volatility depends on the characteristics of the national wind 
resource, of course.  In the UK context, Sinden (2007) used wind speed data from the 
British Atmospheric Data Centre (which we also use) to show that wind speeds and 
likely wind outputs were higher, on average, at the times of higher electricity demand, 
and that the correlation between the output of wind generators would decrease as they 
were placed further apart.  This would reduce the impact of wind variability on the 
market.4  Sinden did not, however, choose to present any distributions of wind output, 
to show the minimum contribution that might be reasonably anticipated, and hence the 
need for back-up plant.  Oswald et al (2008) remedy this omission and also show that 
conditions of low wind speeds over the UK would often be correlated with low wind 
speeds on the Continent, reducing the benefits of interconnection.  They present data 
on the variable demand that thermal stations in the UK would have to meet, but do not 
translate this into price impacts.  
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 At a theoretical level, Twomey and Neuhoff (this issue) consider how the 
relationship between wind output and market prices is affected by market power.  
First, they show that wind generators are likely to receive less than the time-weighted 
average price of power, since high levels of output from wind generators (assuming a 
sufficiently high share of capacity) will tend to depress the spot price.  Second, they 
show that since generators with market power are likely to exercise it to a greater 
extent when their residual demand is high, this will tend to strengthen the inverse 
relationship between prices and wind generation, and hence exacerbate this effect.  
(The exercise of market power does increase the profits of price-taking renewable 
generators, but by less than those of the conventional generators.)  Third, they find 
that long-term contracts (forward contracts or, particularly, option contracts) reduce 
the second effect – renewable generators now share a higher proportion of the gains of 
market power achieved by conventional stations.  They work with a small-scale 
model, using plausible numbers, but not a full representation of the electricity system.   
This paper considers the impact of wind generators on market prices within a full-
scale simulation of the British wholesale market.  
  
 
3. The Model 
 
The model is based on that used in Green (2008a) and Yago et al (2008), but with 
additional detail in the wind sector.  We assume that generators compete in supply 
functions, offering a schedule of prices and quantities to the market.  The original 
paper on supply function equilibria (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) assumed that this 
was because the firms faced an uncertain demand function.  Green and Newbery 
 9 
(1992) applied this concept to the British electricity market, pointing out that variation 
in demand due to uncertainty was mathematically equivalent to variation due to 
changing conditions over time.  In the British electricity market of the early 1990s, in 
which generators had to submit offers that would last for an entire day, the latter 
source of demand variation was far more important than the former.  Generators now 
trade in separate markets for every half-hour, effectively eliminating variation over 
time, but the output from wind power (and the difference between actual and forecast 
levels of output) will provide an additional source of uncertainty. 
 The supply function is obtained when the firms try to maximise the following 
profit function: 
( ), ij j
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The model calculates the industry supply function, rather than individual firm 
functions, “as if” the industry contained a number of symmetric firms.  That number 
is given by the inverse of the industry’s Herfindahl index.  This allows us to work 
with an industry-wide cost function, and ignore the difficulties of numerically 
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deriving asymmetric supply functions – Evans and Green (2005) show that for the 
linear case in which exact solutions exist, this approximation is a good one.  In our 
base case, we assume the equivalent of six symmetric firms, which implies little 
change in concentration from current levels. 
We have taken the capacity of the main types of thermal plant from the 
Supergen “supportive regulation” scenario (Elders et al, 2008).  This is a scenario in 
which there is some expansion of renewable generation, over and above the wind 
power that we are modelling here, and a modest increase in nuclear capacity.  Most of 
the additional and replacement capacity that will be needed, however, comes from 
combined cycle gas turbine stations. These are shown in table 1.  To put the numbers 
in context, our maximum demand (adjusted to 2020) is 68.8 GW, and our minimum is 
22.3 GW. We have reduced the CCGT capacity, relative to the scenario, because 
those stations’ revenues with the original level of capacity only covered a small 
proportion of their fixed costs.6 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
 The industry cost function used is based on data from the UK government’s 
2006 Energy Review (DTI, 2006).  For each type of plant, the review gives data on 
capital cost, operating and maintenance cost, and the efficiency with which it converts 
its fuel to electricity (if applicable).  We use the DTI Central Case favouring Coal 
(i.e., a medium-high gas price) for our fuel prices.  Our supply function for thermal 
plant is shown in figure 1 – the lower line shows the modelled marginal cost, and the 
upper line the strategic price offers that 6 symmetric firms would submit, given our 
assumed demand slope.  
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Figure 1 about here 
 
We do not consider the costs of starting a plant, or changing its output levels – 
this is an important extension for future work.  In the past, it was only at peak times of 
day that start-up costs made a significant contribution to marginal cost.  At other 
times, plants which were started to meet the rising load in one period would have been 
needed in the subsequent period in any case, and so their start-up cost would have 
contributed little or nothing to the marginal cost of meeting demand.  The level of the 
supply function at peak times depends far more on the margin between price and 
marginal cost (determined by demand elasticity and the number of firms) than on the 
level of marginal cost.  In other words, ignoring this issue may not have significantly 
biased the results. 
 In future, rapid variations in wind output will sometimes require thermal plant 
to be started or shut down at other times, and limits on the rate at which generators 
can change their output may bind more often.  At times, this will increase the 
marginal cost of meeting demand; but at others, it will reduce it.  From the point of 
view of establishing the overall distribution of prices, the effects may cancel out.  This 
conjecture obviously requires further work, but with an engineering model, rather than 
a game-theoretic one.  
 Our model is calibrated to 2020, and we assumed that the nuclear power 
stations currently owned by British Energy would still be independent of the 
industry’s other large firms at that date.  This means that we subtract the available 
nuclear capacity from demand when we calculate the supply that needs to come from 
the industry’s “strategic” firms, rather than adding it to those firms’ supply functions.7 
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 Similarly, we subtract the output of wind stations from demand, rather than 
adjusting the supply functions.  If none of the wind stations was owned by a strategic 
generator, the two approaches would be equivalent, and it is more straightforward to 
calculate a single supply function and compare it with wind-adjusted demand curves, 
than to calculate many wind-adjusted supply functions.  A strategic generator that 
owned wind farms would wish to take their output into account when calculating the 
supply function from its thermal plant, raising the price-cost margin for a given 
amount of thermal output to take account of the infra-marginal wind output that will 
also benefit from higher prices.  Given that some of the large generators in Great 
Britain do own wind farms, we therefore under-estimate the likely mark-ups, 
particularly at times of high wind output (when the demand on thermal plant, and 
hence prices, will be relatively lower).  Given the shape of the supply function, 
however, this effect will be small over most of its length.  A study of the best way to 
incorporate wind generation into a supply function (remembering that much trading 
takes place well in advance of real time, before accurate wind forecasts are available) 
is another area for further research.   
 As described in the next section, we use hourly wind data, and so calculate 
hourly, rather than half-hourly prices and outputs.  The demand curves are based on 
the actual hourly demands from our period, obtained from National Grid.  Each hourly 
figure was scaled up to reflect the demand growth between its year and 2020, 
assuming a future growth rate of 1.1% a year.  The scaling was based on the ratio of 
each year’s annual weather-adjusted energy requirements to those predicted for 2020, 
rather than on peak demand figures, and thus preserves all the variation in year-to-
year demand due to weather conditions.  We use a linear demand slope of –80MW per 
£/MWh, which gives an elasticity at the mean values of price and quantity of 
 13 
approximately –0.2 (based on the wholesale price).  The demand elasticity based on 
the retail price (which is higher) is around –0.3, the level used in the Office of Gas 
and Electricity Market’s regulatory impact assessments. 
  
 
4. Wind Data and Outputs 
 
We predict hourly outputs from wind generators located in nineteen onshore and 
eleven offshore regions.  They reflect the distribution of existing and proposed wind 
stations around Great Britain, using information available from the British Wind 
Energy Association (2008).  We have assumed that capacity equivalent to that 
existing, under construction or in the planning process is built in each onshore region, 
scaled up to give 11 GW of onshore wind.  We also distributed 19 GW of offshore 
wind over our offshore regions, largely in the English part of the North Sea.  These 
headline figures are those which the transmission system operators are currently 
considering in their investment planning process (National Grid, 2008).  The regions 
and their capacities are shown in table 2.  Some weather stations are used for both 
coastal and offshore wind generators – we describe the adjustment we made to their 
wind speeds below. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
We have obtained hourly wind speed data from 1993 to 2005 for selected 
weather stations from the UK Meteorological Office (available at 
badc.nerc.ac.uk/data/ukmo-midas).  Our choice of stations was based on two criteria: 
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first, the station had to be in an area with a significant amount of wind generation 
(existing or planned); second, the data series needed to be reasonably complete.  
Rather than dropping days for which we did not have a complete set of observations 
across all of our 25 stations, we created synthetic data for the number of missing 
observations.  When a single hour at a time was missing from the series, we 
interpolated the missing values.  When more than one hour was missing, we imputed 
values from a regression of that station’s wind speed on the speeds observed at nearby 
stations which had a high correlation with it in that year.8   
 We used a standard power curve for the relationship between wind speed, 
measured at a 10 metre mast, and the output from a 1.75 MW turbine with a hub 
height of 65 meters.9  This gave us a provisional set of outputs for 19 areas onshore 
and 11 offshore.  These outputs were provisional because we knew our weather 
stations could well have a lower (or higher) average wind speed than the sites 
preferred by wind generators.  For example, a number were at Royal Air Force bases 
which required large areas flat enough for runways, while wind farms are often built 
on hills.  We have assumed that when it is relatively windy at our weather station, it 
would also be relatively windy at wind farms in the region, but recognise that the 
absolute speeds will differ.  
 Our procedure to deal with this is based on that used by Oswald et al (2008).  
For onshore regions, we converted our provisional output patterns for 2005 into load 
factors and compared them with the load factors achieved by actual wind generators 
in the same region in that year.  (These were obtained from the Renewable Energy 
Foundation, at www.ref.org.uk.)  We then scaled the wind speed up or down so that 
the resulting load factor was close to that achieved in practice.10  We also checked 
that the average across all our regions was close to the 27% load factor achieved UK-
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wide in 2007.  For offshore wind stations, where experience to date has been limited 
and disappointing, we chose scaling factors that gave load factors averaging 38%, in 
line with predictions for “settled operation”. 
 If we have over-predicted our load factors, then we will get more output from 
a given set of wind generators than would occur in practice.11  Since the EU is 
adopting a target for renewable output, and not renewable capacity, this implies that a 
greater amount of capacity would be required to meet the target.  Assuming that this 
target binds, and that wind generation remains the favoured way of meeting it, then a 
larger amount of wind capacity would be built, and the total output would be similar 
to that assumed in our simulations.  Any impact on the pattern of that output over 
time, and hence on our price predictions, would be second order.  
Given the relatively limited number of wind stations, we slightly over-estimate 
the variation in wind output – we would expect the load factor of a range of turbines 
within a region to be less variable than that of a single turbine.  However, we do not 
take account of wind variation within an hour, and this would tend to reduce the 
amount of variation in our results, compared to reality. 
 
 
5. Results – Competitive Market 
 
The amount of price volatility due to wind power in an electricity market depends on 
two factors.  The first is the amount of variation in wind output.  The second is the 
relationship between prices and the net demand for thermal generation.  If there are 
many hours with similar levels of wind output, we will not see much price volatility in 
those hours – unless the relationship between price and net demand is extremely 
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sensitive.  Alternatively, if part of the supply curve has a very flat slope, so that large 
changes in the net thermal demand have little impact on the market price, we will see 
little price volatility during hours in which the wind output places us on that part of 
the supply curve.  Significant price volatility requires first, sufficiently changing 
levels of wind output, and second, a strong relationship between net demand and 
price.  We start to explore these relationships in a case with the equivalent of six 
competitive generators – a workably competitive wholesale market.   
Figure 2 shows the distribution of output from our 30 GW of wind stations for 
each hour of the day during January, based on 403 daily wind profiles.  We show the 
maximum level of output we obtained, the minimum, the median, and four 
intermediate percentiles.  The maximum outputs imply that almost all our stations 
were simultaneously very close to full capacity, whereas the minima imply that there 
were some hours in which the wind was nowhere strong enough to generate more than 
a trivial amount of power.  The median output is around 40% of capacity, with 
slightly more wind in the afternoon than in the early hours of the morning.  The lower 
quartile is at around 20% of capacity, and the upper quartile at around 60%.  We are 
therefore likely to have more hours with a wind output of between 4 GW and 5 GW 
than with a wind output of between 24 GW and 25 GW, but we will find that the 
distribution is more even than in the summer months.  With volatile wind outputs, our 
first precondition for volatile prices is fulfilled.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Figure 3 shows the resulting price simulations, giving the distribution of prices 
for each hour of the day in January.  For much of the day, we obtain a wide range of 
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prices – at the early evening peak, the maximum price we observe is three times the 
minimum.  This reflects the variability in wind speed, and its significant impact on 
total production (and hence the net demand for thermal plant, on which the price 
depends) once the amount of wind capacity has grown.  The variation in prices is 
greatest in the peak demand hours, because the supply function is convex, and so a 
given variation in wind output (and thermal demand) produces a greater variation in 
prices when they are already high.  
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
In most hours, the minimum price recorded is close to zero.  If the wind output 
is high enough, relative to demand, to displace all the gas and coal-fired plant, this 
implies prices would have to fall to the level at which either wind or nuclear 
generators would have to be constrained off.  In our simulations, we set this to be a 
small positive price – in practice, however, both nuclear and wind generators might 
perceive a high negative cost of spilling output.  Some nuclear plants are inflexible 
and would not be able to reduce output (except by the very costly process of shutting 
down), while wind generators in receipt of output-linked subsidies would need 
compensation for the subsidy foregone if they reduce output.  In the early hours of the 
morning, exceptionally high winds are enough to cause this to happen, even with 
average levels of demand, whereas at other times, high wind and unusually low 
demand are both required for prices to fall this low. 
In the early hours of the morning, the distance between the 10th and 90th 
percentiles of prices is relatively small – within this range, the different levels of wind 
output have relatively little impact on wholesale market prices at these times.  The 
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industry supply function is relatively flat when little fossil-fuelled plant is running, 
and so the price is insensitive to the exact amount of thermal generation required.  In 
other words, the second condition for volatile prices, introduced at the start of this 
section, does not hold.   
This flat section of the supply function is also responsible for the relative 
insensitivity of the market price to the level of wind generation in daytime hours when 
the wind is above average and prices are low.  The gap between the median and the 
minimum price in daytime hours is far smaller than that between the maximum and 
the median.  This implies that the marginal impact of a moving a set number of places 
through the distribution of wind outputs is lower when the wind is strong than when it 
is weak.  Although moving from the 75th to the 90th percentile of wind outputs implies 
a greater change in output than a move from the 10th to the 25th percentile, the supply 
curve is so much flatter over the range that is relevant when the wind output is high 
than when it is low that this effect dominates.  We thus find prices that are relatively 
insensitive to wind conditions when winds are high, and more sensitive when they are 
low. 
Figure 4 shows the pattern of wind outputs for July.  While the maximum 
output is between 70% and 90% of the industry’s capacity, the median output is 
generally between 10% and 20%, with only a few hours in the afternoon where it 
approaches 30%.  For fourteen hours of the twenty-four, the lower quartile output is 
less than 10% of capacity.  In other words, the distribution of outputs is heavily 
skewed towards the lower end of the range. 
 
Figure 4 about here 
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Figure 5 shows how this pattern of wind outputs feeds through to prices.  Once 
again, high winds can send prices to the minimum level allowed in the simulation.  If 
this does not happen, however, the level of price variation is lower than in January, 
whatever the time of day.  The demand for thermal generation is much lower, even 
after adjusting for the lower levels of availability during the summer maintenance 
period, and taking the generally lower wind speeds into account.  This means that the 
industry stays on a flatter part of its supply function than in January, and prices vary 
less with the wind output.  Furthermore, the variation in wind output between the 
highest and the lowest profiles is smaller than in January, and the asymmetry between 
the marginal effects of higher and lower levels of wind output has disappeared.  The 
other key difference is that prices are highest around lunchtime, which is when 
demand is highest. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The price distributions for the other months, which we do not report here, are 
somewhere between those for January and July.  The “winter” profiles between 
November and March have their highest prices in the early evening, whereas 
“summer” profiles between April and October see prices peaking around lunchtime.  
Prices are most dispersed in the winter months, and the dispersion falls as we move 
towards mid-summer. 
These price distributions imply that anyone trading – on either side of the 
market – on the basis of spot prices is likely to see wide variations in their daily 
profitability, depending on the wind.  Thermal generators that are only required on a 
few occasions (but are then vital to prevent power cuts) could see a significant part of 
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their earning potential disappear if they are not in fact available to generate at those 
times.  This provides a strong incentive to be ready to run when needed, but also 
makes the task of designing adequate systems to remunerate these plants particularly 
challenging. 
We are not convinced that daily variability in prices matters for wind 
generators, however.  It would be completely inappropriate to measure their financial 
performance over such a short timescale.  Instead, figure 6 shows the range of annual 
wholesale market revenues received by our onshore wind stations, giving the 
maximum, minimum and median among our 13 simulated years.  The variation 
between years is clearly visible, with an average range between the highest and lowest 
revenues of £25/kW-year.  This is equal to one-third of the median revenues (note that 
our graph has a false zero).  It is obviously something that should concern a generator 
(100% debt finance would seem inadvisable), but this level of risk, on its own, would 
not make them uneconomic.  We also found that the variation across a portfolio of 
stations was lower – when one station had a bad year, another might be having a good 
one.   
The generators will also receive a revenue stream from the Renewables 
Obligation, the UK’s support scheme of tradable green certificates, which we have not 
shown here.  The price of these certificates depends on the total amount of renewable 
generation, relative to the government target, and this has depended far more on the 
number of plants able to obtain planning permission than on year-to-year variations in 
wind speeds.  At the level of individual stations, the impact of year-to-year variations 
in output, holding the price of certificates constant, is comparable (in terms of 
coefficient of variation) to that of wholesale market revenues.  The price of 
certificates is currently just over £50/MWh; with an increase in renewable output, 
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relative to targets, this might fall in future, though there will be a floor at about 
£38/MWh.  This implies that onshore wind generators (who receive one certificate per 
MWh generated) will receive just over half of their income through this mechanism, 
given the prices we are predicting, while offshore generators, receiving two 
certificates per MWh generated, will get more than two-thirds of their total revenues 
from the scheme.  This will have a significant impact on the generators’ profits during 
the lifetime of the scheme, but it will have little impact on the risks they face from 
wind variations. 
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
 
 
6. Results – Duopoly  
 
We repeated our analysis for a case in which the industry’s thermal capacity was split 
between the equivalent of just two symmetric firms.  This is an extreme case, unlikely 
to be seen again in the UK, although it was representative of the situation shortly after 
privatisation in 1990.  In some countries on the Continent, however, there is a single 
dominant firm, and a highly concentrated market remains a real possibility, although 
(enough) cross-border transmission can provide effective competition. 
 Figure 7 shows the distribution of prices we obtained for our January demand 
profile.  It should be noted that this is on a very different scale to figure 3, and that 
prices are much higher in every hour of the day.  The mean price over the day is twice 
as great with two firms as with six.  There is also far more variation in prices.  The 
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range between the 10th and 90th percentiles averages £70/MWh, or almost 90% of the 
median price.  With six strategic firms, the range had an average of £19/MWh, just 
over 50% of the median price.   
Figure 7 about here 
 
As before, we find that particularly large amounts of wind output can drive 
prices to the minimum level allowed in the simulation.  Apart from this, the 
distribution is much more nearly symmetric with regard to the wind.  In other words, 
the impact on prices of moving from the 25th to the 10th percentile of wind outputs 
will be similar to that of moving from the 90th to the 75th.  The more competitive 
supply function had a long section that was nearly flat, over which changes in wind 
output would have had little impact on the market price.  This was the section which 
was relevant for high wind speeds, and had outweighed the fact that a one-percentile 
change in wind output implied a greater change in GW when the wind was strong than 
when it was weak.  With only two firms, the industry supply function is steeper than 
with six firms.  For a given number of firms, the supply function will still be steeper 
when the wind output is low than when it is high, but the difference is now less 
pronounced, and is balanced by the greater absolute changes in wind output seen at 
high wind speeds.  
Figure 8 shows the distribution of prices in July.  The average level of prices 
and their variability are lower than in January, but much higher than in the simulation 
for July with six strategic firms.  The marginal impact of moving a given number of 
places through the distribution of wind outputs has now been reversed – it is greater 
when the wind is high than when the wind is low.  This is because the wind outputs in 
July are clustered around low values.  When the wind speed is low, an increase of one 
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percentile in the rank order will imply a lower gain in wind output than an increase of 
one percentile when the wind is blowing strongly.  With a small change in output, the 
change in prices is also small, even though an equal change in output would have 
given a greater change in prices, given the greater slope of the supply function.  In the 
more competitive case, the supply function is so flat for low levels of thermal output 
that this outweighs the impact of having a greater change in wind output for a given 
move through the ranking. 
 
Figure 8 about here 
 
Figure 9 shows the annual variability in revenues, for the duopoly case and 
also for the equivalent of six competitive firms.  The wind generators’ revenues are 
quite clearly both higher and more variable in the less competitive case.  However, the 
variability is no greater, in proportion to the average revenues, than in the six-firm 
simulation.  This implies that the presence of market power would not increase the 
relative level of risk faced by wind generators, and it would certainly raise their 
profitability.  
 
Figure 9 about here 
 
Twomey and Neuhoff (this issue), however, have pointed out that wind 
generators will not gain as much from market power as thermal generators do.  Our 
simulations allow us to calculate the significance of this point, and we present the 
relevant figures in table 3.  In the competitive (6-firm) case, the time-weighted annual 
average price that would be received by a base-load generator (ignoring the need for 
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maintenance) averages £34.80/MWh, with a range from maximum to minimum of just 
4% of this mean value.  On average, our onshore wind generators earn £32.12/MWh, 
8% less than the base-load price.  This difference is the result of two factors with 
opposite effects on the wind generators’ revenues.  First, within each month, the price 
is lower when the wind generators’ output is higher, which tends to depress the wind 
generators’ average earnings.  Second, in the UK, there is more wind in the winter 
months when prices are (on average) higher, and this tends to raise the wind 
generators’ average earnings.   
We find that offshore wind generators earn £31.86/MWh, 1% less than the 
onshore generators.  There are more offshore than onshore generators, and so their 
outputs will have a greater impact on the market price.  This will tend to increase the 
gap between their output-weighted price and the time-weighted price for a given day.  
Furthermore, their outputs are slightly less skewed towards the winter months of 
higher prices, reducing the impact of a factor that raised the average revenues of 
onshore stations. 
When we consider the case with market power, the annual time-weighted price 
that a conventional base-load generator would receive (ignoring maintenance) has a 
mean of £78.21/MWh, more than double the previous case.  The variability of prices 
has also increased, both absolutely and relatively, with a range equal to 7% of the 
mean.  Wind generators do not fare as well in this scenario, relative to their 
conventional cousins.  Onshore generators receive only £66.27/MWh, 15% below the 
time-weighted average price.12  As Twomey and Neuhoff predicted, there is a 
stronger negative correlation between the output of wind stations and the market price 
in the presence of market power, and this reduces the wind generators’ earnings – 
albeit only in a relative sense.  Furthermore, in the supply function model, we find 
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that average prices in the summer increase by relatively more than in the winter.  
While winter prices remain higher than summer prices, their lower (relative) increase 
reduces the benefit that wind stations gained from producing more in the winter than 
in the summer. 
Our offshore wind generators earn £65.10/MWh on average, 17% below the 
time-weighted average – once again, they tend to fare worse than the onshore 
generators because their greater outputs have a bigger impact on the market price.  
However, because their outputs are slightly more evenly spread across the year than 
those of the onshore stations, the relative increase in summer prices (compared to 
winter prices) helps the offshore stations.  This means that the gap between their 
revenues and the time-weighted annual average price is only slightly greater than that 
for the onshore stations. 
The magnitude of these effects is comparable to those shown by Twomey and 
Neuhoff in their Figure 4.  Their paper also includes a model with contracts, which 
depress the average market price without reducing the impact of market power on its 
volatility.  The comparative disadvantage of wind generators comes from that 
volatility, so that in this model, they can receive an average revenue close to (or even 
below) the competitive level, even though conventional generators still earn super-
normal profits.  We surmise that we would obtain similar results if we added contracts 
to this model.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
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We have found that electricity wholesale spot prices in Great Britain would be 
significantly affected by the amount of wind generation in each hour, if the UK relies 
on wind generation to meet a large share of its targets for renewable energy.  This 
short-term volatility would be exacerbated in the presence of market power. 
 For many generators and electricity consumers, however, short-run volatility 
of this kind should not be a major problem, even without the use of hedging 
instruments, as much of the volatility will cancel itself out over a longer period.  In 
the absence of market power, the range of annual time-weighted prices between the 
year with the least wind and the year with the most13 was just 4%.  Individual wind 
generators face more uncertainty, combining their own volatile output with the 
variable market price.  The range between the highest and lowest annual revenues for 
a typical onshore station was £25/kW-year, just under one-third of their mean income 
(from the wholesale market) of £77/kW-year.  We do not believe that this level of 
variation would cause serious difficulties, particularly remembering that wind 
generators also receive support from the Renewables Obligation, a system of tradable 
green certificates. 
 Finally, we were able to assess the impact of market power (amongst 
conventional generators) in a market with a significant amount of variable generation.  
We found that prices were higher and more volatile, but that the volatility in wind 
generators’ incomes rose only in proportion to those incomes.  We did find that wind 
generators gained less than base-load generators from the increase in prices due to 
market power, as predicted by Twomey and Neuhoff (this issue).  While the base load 
price rose by 125% when we replaced a workably competitive six-firm structure with 
a duopoly, onshore wind generators’ revenues rose by “only” 106% and offshore 
generators’ revenues by 104%.  While the wind generators clearly gain less from 
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others’ exercise of market power than conventional generators do, they are hardly 
disadvantaged by it! 
While we believe that the volatility of generators’ revenues due to wind 
variation is unlikely to be a serious obstacle to them, an obvious extension is to 
consider the benefits of combining a number of wind generators in different parts of 
the country in a single portfolio, or to combine wind and thermal generators – a 
solution considered by Awerbuch (2000).   If the windiest sites still available for 
development are close together, there will be a trade-off between building most of the 
new capacity at these sites to obtain the highest possible output and dispersing 
generators to obtain the diversity benefits of a less correlated resource.  Our model 
will allow us to quantify this trade-off. 
 We have simulated market prices for an assumed level of wind and thermal 
capacity, and not sought to find a long-term equilibrium.  For that reason, our results 
should not be seen as predicting the average level of electricity prices, even if out-turn 
fuel prices are close to those we assume.  The next stage is to calculate the full static 
equilibrium of the wholesale market, as described by Sáenz de Miera at al (2008), in 
which the amount of each kind of capacity is such that it just breaks even from the 
resulting market prices.  Such a model would neglect the dynamics of investment, 
however, as it would not show whether generators would find it optimal to own this 
capacity mix in a world of volatile fuel prices.  Our long-term aim is to use the short-
term model of wholesale pricing described in this paper as an input into a study of 
investment behaviour in an uncertain world.  If the volatile prices revealed in this 
paper prove too much of a disincentive for investment, the UK could face significant 
problems in its transition towards a lower-carbon electricity system.  
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Table 1: Generation Capacity by type of plant 
Generation technology Installed Capacity (MW) 
Onshore wind 11,018 
Offshore wind 19,016 
Marine generation 2,000 
Biomass 1,453 
Hydro 2,000 
Micro-generation 250 
Nuclear 13,000 
CCGT 30,000 
Coal 12,000 
Total 98,737 
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Table 2: Wind Generation Capacities by Region  
 
Wind region Installed 
Capacity (MW) 
Representative Weather Station 
Onshore: Name SRC ID 
Aberdeen 236 Dyce 161 
Argyll 709 Machrihanish 908 
Cornwall 129 St Mawgan 1405 
Cumbria 328 Warcop Range 1076 
Devon 147 Chivenor 1346 
E Anglia 560 Wittering 583 
Fife 686 Leuchars 235 
Galloway 697 West Freugh 1039 
Mid Wales 575 Aberporth 1198 
Moray 734 Kinloss 132 
N East 475 Boulmer 315 
N Wales 173 Valley 1145 
Orkney 41 Kirkwall 23 
S Wales 300 Pembrey Sands 1226 
SE Scotland 2526 Charterhall 268 
SW Scotland 1295 Eskdalemuir 1023 
Thames 105 Manston 775 
W Isles 726 Stornway Airport 54 
Yorkshire 575 Waddington 384 
Offshore:    
Aberdeen Offshore 500 Inverbervie No 2 177 
Moray Offshore 510 Kinloss 132 
N East Offshore 2094 Boulmer 315 
N Wales Offshore 990 Valley 1145 
Norfolk Offshore 1560 Weybourne 421 
S Wales Offshore 108 Pembrey Sands 1226 
SW Scotland Offshore 180 Carlisle 1070 
Thames Offshore 1562 Manston 775 
Walney Offshore 1460 Walney Island No 2 1078 
Wash Offshore  6752 Holbeach 421 
Yorkshire Offshore 3300 Donna Nook No 2 405 
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Table 3: Annual average prices and revenues 
 
6 firms 
Price: 
time-weighted 
average (£/MWh) 
Revenues for an 
onshore station 
(£/MWh) 
Revenues for an 
offshore station 
(£/MWh) 
   Max 35.45 33.59 32.42 
   Mean 34.80 32.12 31.86 
   Min 34.00 31.42 31.05 
   Range 1.44 2.18 1.36 
  (relative to mean) 0.04 0.07 0.04 
2 firms    
   Max 80.67 69.59 67.63 
   Mean 78.21 66.27 65.10 
   Min 74.83 63.12 61.64 
   Range 5.84 6.47 5.99 
  (relative to mean) 0.07 0.10 0.09 
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Wind output variation - January 
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Wind output variation - July
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Revenue variability across regions
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Price variation due to wind - July
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1 Great Britain does not actually have such a market at present, relying on bilateral trading between 
generators and the system operator, but creating one would be an appropriate response to the challenges 
of integrating large amounts of renewable generation (Green, 2008b). 
2 See, for instance, Gonzalez (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the literature summarising the links 
between the 20% emission reduction target and the 20% target for renewable generation. 
3 Sáenz de Miera et al point out that since the rise in wind generation will reduce fossil generation and 
hence the demand for permits in the EU (carbon) Emissions Trading Scheme, this would reduce their 
price, causing additional indirect effects on the marginal cost of electricity – that is, assuming that 
policy-makers do not reduce the number of permits available, using the expansion of renewable 
generation to accept a tougher target for carbon emissions. 
4 In the case of Denmark, for instance, Østergaard (2007) finds an explicit negative correlation between 
the geographic extent of the area in which fluctuating wind power is being exploited and the average 
need for reserve capacity. 
5   For a detailed discussion of the supply function model, see Green (2008a).   
6 An anonymous referee suggested that we should check this aspect of the consistency of our results.  
We have not sought a full long-run equilibrium, in which every type of plant covers its average costs, 
but established a level of CCGT capacity in which they, as the marginal entrants, approximately do so. 
7 A recently-announced agreement between British Energy and EdF makes this assumption incorrect, 
but its consequences are quantitative rather than qualitative differences in the results we report. 
8 We used annual estimates to minimise the impact of any clustered missing values in the proxy 
stations wind speed series. 
9 In practice, some turbines will be higher and some lower than this – the higher turbines will have 
greater outputs, as the wind is faster away from the ground.  This will not significantly affect our 
results, for reasons discussed below. 
10 Oswald et al used a different correction factor for each month within a three-year dataset.  We had a 
much longer dataset, and no reference against which to correct early years, so used a single annual 
figure throughout. 
11 If some turbines are different sizes from those than we have assumed, and hence give more or less 
output at a given wind speed, the same effect will apply.  
12 This 15% difference is consistent with the 18% cited earlier – we have switched denominator. 
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13 We mean “most” in the sense of producing the greatest output at times when it has an impact in 
reducing prices, rather than in terms of the physical amount of wind. 
